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ABSTRACT. This paper studies the impact of competition on the degree of ineffi-
ciency in lemons markets. More precisely, we characterize the second-best mech-
anism (i.e., the optimal mechanism with private information) in a stylized lemons
market with finite numbers of buyers and sellers. We then study the relationship
between the degree of efficiency of the second-best mechanism and market com-
petitiveness. The relationship between the first-best and second-best mechanisms
is also explored.
JEL Classification Numbers: C7, D4, D61, D82.
“. . . most cars tradedwill be the “lemons,” and good carsmay not be traded
at all. The “bad” cars tend to drive out the good (in much the same way
that bad money drives out the good).” GEORGE A. AKERLOF, The Market
for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 1970.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background. It is conventional wisdom that competition is a good thing. The
more the better. By fostering appropriate individual incentives, competition can
help promote aggregate (or social) welfare. Economics textbooks are replete with
models in which aggregate welfare increases with the degree of competition. One
classic example of this key insight is provided by Cournot’s model of imperfect
competition: in this model, the difference between the Nash equilibrium market
price and the constant marginal cost of production is strictly decreasing (and ag-
gregate welfare is strictly increasing) in the number of competing firms.
Does competition have a similar beneficial impact in markets with asymmetric
information? While it is well established that such markets tend in general to be
inefficient (except perhaps in the restrictive, limiting scenario when they contain
an arbitrarily large number of traders), much less is known about how the degree
of inefficiency varies with the degree of competition. An overall aim of this paper
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is to answer this question for markets with quality uncertainty, which, following
Akerlof (1970), are termed lemons markets.
It goes without saying that a better understanding of the relationship between
competition and efficiency in lemons markets is useful not only from a theoretical
perspective but also from a practical (market-design and policy) perspective. Such
understanding should provide insight into the role played by competition on how
well lemons markets function and perform.
A distinguishing characteristic of a lemons market is that when contemplating
the possibility of bilateral trade, one of the traders has relatively more informa-
tion about something (eg., quality of the object for sale) that affects both traders’
payoffs from trade. Such markets are ubiquitous, and have been intensely studied
over the past three decades, both by economic theorists and by applied economists
in the context of specific markets such as credit and labour markets. In his seminal
paper, George Akerlof was the first to argue that lemons markets will typically be
inefficient: sellers owning high quality objects may fail to trade, although there are
buyers who would wish to trade with them. The basic intuition for this fundamen-
tal observation stems from the incentives of the sellers owning low quality objects:
each such seller has an incentive to pretend to own a high quality object in order
to command a high price for her, actually, low quality object. The consequence of
such incentives is that buyers may not be prepared to buy at a price that is high
enough for trade to be profitable for sellers owning high quality objects.
1.2. Our Contribution. We consider a stylized lemonsmarket with finite numbers
of buyers and sellers, in which each seller has private information about the qual-
ity of the object that she owns. A main objective is to characterize the maximal
possible degree of efficiency that such a market can attain in any equilibrium. As
such we do not study this market with any given, specific set of trading rules. This
is because doing so would leave open the possibility that with a different set of
trading rules it might be the case that a higher degree of efficiency is attained in
equilibrium. Instead, we characterize the second-best mechanism, which defines the
maximal achievable level of efficiency. Our approach thus involves considering
all outcomes that can be achieved as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of some game
(induced by some set of trading rules). In order to conduct such a normative ex-
ercise, we use the mechanism design methodology, in which details of the trading
rules are irrelevant. Of course, this exercise is made possible by appealing to the
Revelation Principle, which allows us to confine attention to direct mechanisms in
which agents truthfully report their private information.
A central contribution of this paper, therefore, is the characterization of the
second-best mechanism (i.e., the optimal mechanism with private information) in a
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stylized lemons market with finite numbers of buyers and sellers. That is, we char-
acterize the mechanism which maximizes expected social surplus subject to satis-
fying appropriate incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints,
and being budget balanced. This analysis extends Samuelson (1984) who charac-
terized the second-best mechanism for bilateral lemons markets. Samuelson, like
us, uses the mechanism design methods introduced byMyerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) who characterized the second-bestmechanism for bilateral markets with pri-
vate values. Gresik and Satterthwaite (1989) extend Myerson and Satterthwaite by
characterizing the second-best mechanism for finite markets with private values.
Having characterized the second-best mechanism, we then study its properties.
In particular, we show that the degree of efficiency of the second-best mechanism
(and its relationship to the first-best) depends on the numbers of buyers and sellers,
the likelihood of any seller owning a lemon rather than a peach, and whether the
gains from trade are higher from trading a lemon or from trading a peach.1 In order
to highlight some of our results, we now briefly describe a few of the properties of
the relationship between relative efficiency andmarket competitiveness, where the
former is the “distance” (eg., ratio) between the degree of efficiency of the second-
best mechanism and the first-best.2
Consider the scenario in which the market contains a single buyer and N ≥ 1
sellers, in which the likelihood of any seller owning a lemon is sufficiently high,
and the gains from trade are higher from trading a peach than from trading a
lemon. In this case, we show that for relatively small lemons markets, the rela-
tionship between relative efficiency and competition is either monotonic (strictly
increasing or strictly decreasing) or non-monotonic, depending on exact parameter
values. For relatively large lemons markets, relative efficiency is strictly decreas-
ing in the degree of competition (i.e., the optimal mechanism becomes less efficient
relative to the first-best when the number of sellers is increased beyond a certain
critical point). One (policy) implication is that the “optimal” degree of competition
is uniquely defined and is bounded away from being “too large”.
1A “lemon” denotes a low quality object, while a “peach” denotes a high quality object.
2We study this relationship in two alternative ways. First, we keep the number of buyers fixed,
and study howmaximal expected social surplus changes as the number of sellers is increased. This
is the typical approach adopted by the literature that studies the same issue (of the relationship
between efficiency and competition) for markets with symmetric information; for an example of
recent work along these lines, see Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004). Second, we study how
maximal expected social surplus changes as the numbers of buyers and sellers increases while
keeping the buyer-seller ratio constant. This is the traditional replication scenario adopted by the
literature on markets with private values; see, for example, Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams,
1994).
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While the properties of the optimal mechanism when the number of buyers is
arbitrary but strictly less than the number of sellers are similar to those when there
is a single buyer, the optimalmechanism is distinctively different when the number
of competing sellers is less than or equal to the number of buyers. In this latter case,
we show that if the likelihood of any seller owning a lemon is sufficiently small,
then the optimal mechanism implements the first-best. If, on the other hand, the
likelihood of any seller owning a lemon is sufficiently large, then the ratio of the
maximal achievable level of expected surplus to the first-best expected surplus is
a constant, strictly less than one. Thus, when the number of buyers in the market
is greater than or equal to the number of sellers, increasing the number of sellers
(while maintaining the number of buyers at least equal to the number of sellers)
does not affect maximal efficiency.
Before proceeding further, we should mention that our results establish that
lemons markets will in general not attain the first-best outcome even in the limit
as the number of competing traders becomes arbitrarily large. This specific result
is perhaps not that unexpected, although it should be contrasted with the pos-
itive (limiting) result that has been established for markets with other kinds of
asymmetric information such as with private values (see, for example, Rustichini,
Satterthwaite and Williams, 1994).
1.3. Organization of the Paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 lays down our baseline model, as follows. Subsection 2.1 describes
our basic market environment: in this benchmark set-up, there is a single buyer
and a finite number of sellers, where each seller is one of two “types” and the
sellers’ types are independently and identically distributed. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that trading a peach generates a higher surplus than trading a lemon. Sub-
sections 2.2 and 2.3 formulate the mechanism design problem. Section 3 solves this
problem, characterizes the second-best mechanism, and derives the relationship
between the efficiency of the second-best mechanism and market competitiveness
(and compares all this to the first-best).
Section 4 considers several extensions to our baseline model, as follows. Sub-
section 4.1 studies the alternative scenario in which trading a lemon generates a
higher surplus than trading a peach, and subsection 4.2 studies the general case
with arbitrary numbers of buyers and sellers. Subsections 4.3–4.6 briefly consider
several other extensions including ones that consider environments with a con-
tinuum of types, correlation in the sellers’ types, and private information on the
buyer’s side.
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We conclude in section 5 with a discussion of some aspects of our model and
main results, and relate our contribution to the literature. In particular, in subsec-
tion 5.2, we study how the efficiency of the second-best mechanism responds to
an increase in both the number of sellers and the number of buyers while keeping
the ratio of these numbers constant. This exercise offers an alternative perspective
on the relationship between efficiency and competitiveness. The results and in-
sights obtained are similar to those obtained when we keep the number of buyers
constant while changing the number of the sellers.
2. THE BASELINE MODEL
2.1. Market Environment. The market in the baseline model consists of a single
buyer and a finite number N of sellers, where N ≥ 1. Each seller owns one unit
of an indivisible object whose quality q is her private information. It is either low
quality (a “lemon”), q = L, or high quality (a “peach”), q = H. The probability that
it is a lemon isα and the probability that it is a peach is 1−α, where 0 < α < 1.
The buyer is interested in acquiring one and only one unit of the object. He
values a lemon at vL and a peach at vH, where vH > vL. A seller’s reservation
values for a lemon and a peach are respectively cL and cH, where cH > cL. If the
buyer acquires an object of quality q at price p, then his net payoff is vq − p (where
q = L,H and p ≥ 0); and if a seller owning an object of quality q sells it at price p,
then her net payoff equals p− cq.3 If an agent does not trade, then his or her net
payoff is zero. All agents are risk-neutral and maximize expected utility.
The surpluses from trading a lemon and a peach are respectively sL ≡ vL − cL
and sH ≡ vH − cH, where sL > 0 and sH > 0. In the baseline model, we assume
that sH > sL — i.e., trading a peach generates a higher surplus than trading a
lemon — as this is the relatively more interesting and more plausible case.
In subsection 4.1 we study the alternative scenario in which sL > sH. While the
logic and much of the analysis in this case is similar to that of the baseline model
in which sH > sL, the main results (concerning in particular the properties of the
second-best mechanism) are rather different. Hence, for the sake of expositional
clarity, it is instructive to deal with these two scenarios separately. Before proceed-
ing further, we should note that for similar reasons the baseline model considers
a market with a single buyer (and N sellers), and we extend the baseline model
to the general case of M buyers and N sellers in subsection 4.2. The analysis and
main insights when M < N are similar to the single buyer (M = 1) case. But some
of the analysis and the main results when M ≥ N are different from the M < N
3While the buyer may ascertain the quality of an object after acquiring it, the terms of trade
cannot be made contingent on quality since that is non-verifiable by “third” parties (such as the
courts).
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case. This arises because in the former case it is feasible for all sellers to trade while
that it is not so in the latter case.
2.2. Incentive Constraints, Participation Constraints and Budget Balance. By a
standard appeal to the Revelation Principle, it suffices to focus on direct mechanisms
where each seller announces her type and the mechanism selects an outcome con-
ditional on the announcements of all sellers.4 Furthermore, without loss of gener-
ality, we restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms where the outcome does not
depend on the names of the sellers.5 Following the Revelation Principle, the mech-
anism needs to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints. We also require it
to satisfy the participation (or individual rationality) constraints and be budget
balanced.6
Given a direct, symmetric mechanism, let pˆq be the probability that a seller sells
her object if she reports that she is a q-type seller (q = L,H). Correspondingly, let
tˆq be the expected revenue that she obtains by doing so.7 Amechanism is incentive-
compatible (IC) if and only if no type of a seller benefits strictly by misrepresenting
4The institutional interaction that underlies a direct mechanism allows a seller to signal her pri-
vately held information through two instruments, namely, price and probability of trade. This
is restrictive in the sense that other (costly) instruments such as warranties or “money burning”
actions are not part of the structure of a direct mechanism. However, the key point of the Revela-
tion Principle is that any outcome that can be generated by any indirect mechanism — including
mechanisms that allow for a richer institution interaction, with various other instruments through
which information could possibly be signalled and/or screened — can be attained through some
direct mechanism. Hence, for the purposes of deriving and characterizing the second-best (which
is the focus of the current paper), one can, without loss of generality, restrict attention to direct
mechanisms.
5The argument for why the restriction to symmetric mechanisms is without loss of generality is
based on the following two observations: (i) an asymmetric mechanism is equivalent to a random
mechanism (one that picks a symmetric mechanism randomly), and (ii) a random mechanism can
do no better than a symmetric mechanism (by definition).
6The former requirement is motivated by the notion that trade is voluntary, while the latter by
the notion that there are no “third” parties (such as governments) who subsidize market trade.
7This characterization of a direct mechanism follows from the Revelation Principle, which says
that any outcome of any indirect mechanism can be captured in this way, with type-contingent
expected transfers and trade probabilities. Wilson (1979, 1980) are early contributions to the liter-
ature on lemons markets in which trade probabilities also feature, but his analysis is restricted to
three specific classes of indirect mechanisms. He does not adopt the mechanism design methodol-
ogy that underlies the analysis in the current paper which allows us to characterize the second-best
mechanism, and maximal efficiency attainable across all possible trading mechanisms.
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her type.8
tˆH − pˆHcH ≥ tˆL − pˆLcH , and(1)
tˆL − pˆLcL ≥ tˆH − pˆHcL.(2)
Individual Rationality (IR) for an arbitrary seller of type q (q = H, L) requires that
the expected payoff from the mechanism be at least the payoff from the outside
option, which is normalized to zero.
tˆH − pˆHcH ≥ 0, and(3)
tˆL − pˆLcL ≥ 0.(4)
Individual Rationality for the buyer follows the same principle. Since the buyer
does not know the type of object owned by any seller, individual rationality re-
quires that his expected payoff from transacting with any individual seller must
be non-negative. This yields (using the requirement that the mechanism be budget
balanced, BB)
(5) (1−α)
[
pˆHvH − tˆH
]
+α
[
pˆLvL − tˆL
]
≥ 0.
The symmetry of the mechanism entails restrictions on pˆH and pˆL. From the
point of view of an individual seller of type H, the probability that there are k other
sellers of type H is given by (N−1k )(1 −α)kαN−1−k; and in this case, symmetry
implies that she sells her product with a probability at most 1/(k + 1). Taking
expectations across all possible realizations of k, it follows that
(6) pˆH ≤ 1−α
N
N(1−α) .
Using a similar argument, it also follows that
(7) pˆL ≤ 1− (1−α)
N
Nα
.
The probability of sale between an arbitrarily chosen seller and the buyer is (1−
α) pˆH +α pˆL. Since the total probability with which trade occurs must be less than
or equal to one, the mechanism must also satisfy
(8) N[(1−α) pˆH +α pˆL] ≤ 1.
8The first inequality is an arbitrary high-type seller’s IC condition while the second is an arbi-
trary low-type seller’s IC condition.
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2.3. Mechanism Design Problem. The expected surplus realized from a symmet-
ric, direct mechanism is N[(1−α) pˆHsH +α pˆLsL]. Observe that the expression in
the square brackets is the expected surplus from the transaction between an arbi-
trarily chosen seller and the buyer. The mechanism design problem is to choose
a symmetric, direct mechanism amongst those that satisfy the two IC constraints,
three IR constraints (within which has been factored the requirement of BB) and
three admissibility constraints that generates the maximal expected surplus. For-
mally, this problem is:
(9) E ≡ max
pˆH , pˆL ,tˆH ,tˆL
N
[
(1−α) pˆHsH +α pˆLsL
]
subject to (1)–(8).
The solution to this maximization problem defines the second-best mechanism
(i.e., the optimal mechanism with private information), to which we now turn.
3. SECOND-BEST MECHANISM
3.1. A Reduced-Form Problem. We solve (9) by defining and solving a reduced-
form problem that involves the following change of variables:
p˜H = N(1−α) pˆH and p˜L = Nα pˆL,
where p˜H and p˜L are respectively the total probabilities with which trade occurs
between the buyer and sellers owning peaches and lemons. Given this change of
variables, the constraints (6)–(8) become
p˜H ≤ 1−αN ,(10)
p˜L ≤ 1− (1−α)N and(11)
p˜L + p˜H ≤ 1,(12)
and the maximand in (9) becomes p˜HsH + p˜LsL. Note that 1−αN (resp., 1− (1−
α)N) is the probability that there exists at least one seller amongst the N sellers
who owns a peach (resp., a lemon). The two IC conditions are satisfied only if the
following inequality holds:9
pˆH ≤ pˆL,
which, using the change of variables defined above, becomes:
(13) p˜H ≤
[
1−α
α
]
p˜L.
9This follows by rewriting (1) and (2) as (pˆH − pˆL)cH ≤ tˆH − tˆL ≤ ( pˆH − pˆL)cL, and then apply-
ing the assumption that cH > cL.
COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY 9
This implication of the sellers’ IC conditions — namely, that the probability pˆH
with which trade occurs with a high-type seller is no greater than the probability
pˆL with which trade occurs with a low-type seller — turns out to be the binding
constraint for some scenarios. In the other scenarios, it is a buyer’s induced IR
constraint (defined below) which will be the binding constraint. The following
lemma contains several other preliminary results:
Lemma 1. At a solution to the mechanism design problem (9), the low-type seller’s IC
constraint, (2), binds as does the high-type seller’s IR constraint, (3). That is:
tˆH = pˆHcH and tˆL = pˆHcH + ( pˆL − pˆH)cL.
Furthermore, the low-type seller’s IR constraint is automatically satisfied with these trans-
fers.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Using Lemma 1, substitute for tˆH and tˆL in the individual rationality constraint
of the buyer, (5), and it becomes (after using the change of variables defined above,
and some simplification):
(14) p˜H
[
sH −α(vH − cL)
]
+ (1−α) p˜LsL ≥ 0.
It should perhaps be emphasized that inequality (14) is not the buyer’s IR con-
straint, but the buyer’s “induced” IR constraint as it is derived after the transfers
implied by two of the constraints are plugged into the buyer’s IR constraint.
Now define the following reduced-form problem:
(15) E∗ ≡ max
p˜H , p˜L
p˜HsH + p˜LsL
subject to (10)–(14).
The following lemma establishes the connection between the two maximization
problems:
Lemma 2. Using the change of variables defined above and the expected transfer payments
stated in Lemma 1, any solution of (15) defines a solution of (9) and vice-versa. Moreover,
E = E∗.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Given Lemma 2, we are now ready to solve for the second-best mechanism by
solving the reduced-form maximization problem (15).
10 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND SURESH MUTUSWAMI
3.2. Second-Best Expected Surplus. Defineα∗ = sH/(vH − vL). Note thatα∗ > 0
since (by assumption) vH > vL and vH > cH. Furthermore, α∗ < 1 if and only if
vL < cH.
Propositions 1 and 2 (below) respectively state the expected surplus E associated
with the second-best mechanism when α ≤ α∗ and α > α∗. We sketch the main
elements of the argument in the text below, but relegate the detailed calculations to
Appendix A (where the solution that underpins the second-best expected surplus
is also derived). As will become clear, some of the analysis and most of the results
differ according to whether α ≤ α∗ or α > α∗. This arises because in the former
(“soft” buyer) case the buyer’s induced IR constraint does not bind (it is the sellers’
IC constraints that do) while in the latter (“tough” buyer) case the buyer’s induced
IR constraint is the binding constraint.
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p˜H [sH −α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1−α)sL = 0
F
p˜H + p˜L = 1
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α
FIGURE 1. Soft Buyer: The feasible set whenα ≤ α∗
We begin by noting that the set of all pairs ( p˜L, p˜H) that satisfy (10)-(13) com-
prises the shaded region in Figure 1. In the absence of (14), therefore, the solution
of (15) lies at point B. If α ≤ α∗, then all points in the shaded region shown in
Figure 1 satisfy (14). Hence:
Proposition 1 (“Soft” Buyer). If α ≤ α∗, then the second-best expected surplus E =
(1−α)sH +αsL.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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We continuewith our argument (which turns to the characterization of the second-
best expected surplus whenα > α∗) after the following remark that provides some
intuition behind Proposition 1 (a fuller discussion of this proposition is deferred to
subsections 3.2 and 3.3).
Remark 1. Point B in Figure 1 depicts the second-best solution, which entails set-
ting p˜L = α and p˜H = 1−α or equivalently, pˆH = pˆL = 1/N. The intuition for
this solution runs as follows. Since sH > sL, maximizing expected surplus entails
making pˆH as large as possible. This means (given admissibility) getting it to be
as close to 1 −αN as possible. But the IC constraint pˆH ≤ pˆL bites, and hence
pˆH = pˆL = pˆ. The desired conclusion then follows immediately because of the ad-
missibility requirement that the total probability with which trade occurs cannot
exceed one (i.e., Npˆ ≤ 1), and optimality then entails setting pˆ = 1/N. The fol-
lowing observations shed further light on the second-best mechanism in the case
under consideration. Using Lemma 1, we obtain that in this case tˆH = tˆL = cH/N.
An indirect mechanism that implements the second-best is the following fixed-
price mechanism: The buyer makes a “take-it-or-leave-it” fixed-price offer, and
then he chooses amongst those sellers who accept to trade at the announced price.
It is easy to verify that there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this indirect
mechanism in which the buyer announces that he is willing to trade at price equal
to cH, each seller of either type accepts to trade at this price, and the buyer then se-
lects to trade with each seller with equal probability (which is 1/N). The expected
surplus generated in this equilibrium is
N
(
1
N
[
(1−α)sH +αsL
])
,
which equals (1−α)sH +αsL, the second-best expected surplus. The buyer’s ex-
pected payoff equals N[(ve − cH)/N] = ve − cH (where ve ≡ (1 −α)vH +αvL),
which is greater than or equal to zero if and only if α ≤ α∗ (which is, of course,
the hypothesis of Proposition 1). The expected payoffs to a high-type seller and a
low-type seller are respectively zero and (cH − cL)/N.
Now let us return to the main argument and assume that α > α∗. In this case
not all points in the shaded region shown in Figure 1 satisfy (14). Figures 2 and
3 show how (14) affects the feasible set depending on whether or not point A re-
mains a feasible point. Point A remains a feasible point if and only if the following
inequality holds:
(16) sL ≥ (1−α)
N−1
1− (1−α)N
[
α(vH − cL)− sH
]
.
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Since the RHS of (16) is strictly decreasing in N, converges to zero in the limit as
N → ∞ and is strictly greater than sL when N = 1, there exists an N∗, where
N∗ ≥ 2, such that (16) holds if and only if N ≥ N∗.
If point A does remain a feasible point (i.e., N ≥ N∗), then the shaded region
shown in Figure 2 comprises the feasible set; in this case the solution of (15) lies
at point C. If, on the other hand, point A does not remain a feasible point (i.e.,
1 ≤ N < N∗), then the shaded region shown in Figure 3 comprises the feasible set;
in this case the solution of (15) lies at point D. Hence:
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FIGURE 2. Tough Buyer and Large Market: The feasible set when α >
α∗, and inequality (16) holds (i.e., N ≥ N∗).
Proposition 2 (“Tough” Buyer). Assume that vL < cH. Ifα > α∗ and:
(i) [Large Markets]. If N ≥ N∗ (i.e., (16) holds), then the second-best expected surplus
E =
α(cH − cL)sL
α(cH − cL)− (1−α)(sH − sL) .
(ii) [Small Markets]. If 1 ≤ N < N∗ (i.e., (16) does not hold), then the second-best
expected surplus
E =
α[1− (1−α)N](cH − cL)sL
α(cH − cL)− (1−α)sH .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
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FIGURE 3. Tough Buyer and Small Market: The feasible set when α >
α∗, and inequality (16) does not hold (i.e., 1 ≤ N < N∗).
Remark 2. Notice that the fixed-price mechanism of Remark 1 does not implement
the second-best mechanism here since it would give the buyer a negative expected
payoff.10 This is consistent with the observation — obtainable from Figures 2 and
3 — that the buyer’s induced IR constraint plays a decisive role in pinning down
the second best mechanism. This constraint, it may be recalled, is the buyer’s IR
constraint after the transfers implied by the low-type’s IC constraint and the high-
type’s IR constraint are factored into it. If N is sufficiently small — how small
depends on the “tightness” of the buyer’s induced IR constraint (cf. Figures 2 and
3) — then the total probability with which trade occurs is strictly less than one.
Only when the market has enough sellers does trade occur for sure, although with
positive probability the “wrong” object is traded (i.e., a lemon is traded instead of
a peach).
3.3. Comparison with the First-Best. The first-best lies at point F; this is because
(since sH > sL), in the first-best trade occurs with a high-type seller unless all
sellers are of low type. Hence, the first-best has p˜H = 1−αN and p˜L = αN. It thus
follows that the first-best cannot be attained by the second-best mechanism except
in the special case when there is a single seller and the buyer is soft (in this special
case, points F and B in Figure 1 coincide). We summarize this in the following
corollary.
10Recall that his expected payoff in this indirect mechanism is non-negative if and only ifα ≤ α∗.
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Corollary 1 (Comparison with the First-Best). The second-best mechanism cannot at-
tain the first-best (except in the special case when the market contains a single seller who
owns a lemon with a sufficiently small probability).
So, the second-best mechanism does not in general implement the first-best out-
come. This result shows that Akerlof’s (1970) central message about the ineffi-
ciency of lemons markets — which he developed in the context of perfectly com-
petitive markets — is robust to imperfect competition. As can be seen from Figures
1 and 2, when the market contains a sufficient number of sellers, trade occurs with
probability one. The second-best mechanism is inefficient, however, because of al-
locative inefficiency: trade occurs with positive probability between the buyer and a
low-type seller even when the market contains a high-type seller. To understand
this better, note that when N is large, it is commonly known that a fraction α are
low-type sellers and 1−α high-type sellers. However, this information cannot be
used to identify whether a given seller is a high-type or a low-type. The uncer-
tainty regarding the type of a seller remains and this explains why the allocative
inefficiency persists even in the limit.
3.4. The Role of Competition. Using the results established above, we can now
answer the following two questions of interest: (i) What impact does an increase
in the number of competing sellers have on the second-best expected surplus? and
(ii) What impact does an increase in the number of competing sellers have on rela-
tive efficiency (i.e., the “distance” between the second-best and first-best expected
surpluses)?
Using Figures 1–3, it is easy to see that (i) ifα ≤ α∗, then the level of second-best
expected surplus E is independent of N; and (ii) ifα > α∗, then there is an integer
N∗ (where N∗ ≥ 2) such that E is strictly increasing in N over the interval [1,N∗),
attains the same or a higher value at N∗ as it does at N∗ − 1, and is a constant for
all N ≥ N∗. Figure 4 illustrates the various possibilities.
Thus, second-best expected surplus does not change with an increase in the
number of competing sellers once the market contains a certain critical number of
them. This is a surprising result. It implies, moreover, that if there is an infinitesi-
mal cost of getting a seller into the market, then second-best welfare (i.e., second-
best expected surplus minus the total cost of having N sellers in the market) is
strictly decreasing in the degree of market competition N, once it is sufficiently
intense. Contrary to conventional wisdom, only a limited degree of competition is
good; too much is bad. In particular, if the buyer is “soft” then the optimal number
of sellers is one, and if the buyer is “tough” then the optimal number of sellers is
N∗ ≥ 2. To put it differently, if the likelihood of sellers owning lemons is small then a
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N = 1 N = N∗ ≥ 2
N
αsL + (1−α)sH
α2 (cH−cL)sL
α(cH−cL )−(1−α)sH
α(cH−cL )sL
α(cH−cL )−(1−α)(sH−sL )
E(N;α > α∗)
E(N;α ≤ α∗)
G(N) = αNsL + (1−αN)sH
FIGURE 4. The relationship between efficiency and the number of
sellers, where G(.) and E(.) respectively denote the first-best and
second-best expected surpluses.
bilateral monopoly is the optimal market structure, but if the likelihood of sellers owning
lemons is high then an oligopoly is the optimal market structure.
The first-best expected surplus G is strictly increasing in N.11 Hence, if the buyer
is soft, then relative efficiency is strictly decreasing in the degree of market compe-
tition. But if the buyer is tough, then the relationship between relative efficiency
and the degree of competition is a bit more complex: For sufficiently large markets
relative efficiency is strictly decreasing in the degree of market competition, but for
sufficiently small markets it can be increasing, decreasing or non-monotonic since
both E and G are strictly increasing in N over the range [1,N∗). Finally, notice that
in the limit as N tends to infinity, the second-best mechanism does not attain the
11First-best expected surplus (for any sL and sH) is G = αNsL + (1−α)NsH + [1−αN − (1−
α)N ]max{sL, sH}. Thus, when sH > sL, G = αNsL + (1−αN)sH .
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first-best.12 The following corollary summarizes two of our main insights regard-
ing the role of market competition:
Corollary 2 (Role of Competition). The second-best expected surplus does not change
with any increase in the number of competing sellers once the market contains a certain
critical number of them. Moreover, the second-best mechanism becomes less efficient rela-
tive to the first-best with any further increase in the degree of competition beyond a certain
critical point.
4. EXTENSIONS
4.1. LemonsGenerateHigher Surplus. Wenow consider our baselinemodel with
the alternative (but relatively less plausible) scenario in which the surplus from
trading a lemon is higher than the surplus from trading a peach (i.e., with the
alternative assumption that sL > sH). It is easy to verify that all the arguments
and preliminary results contained in subsections 2.2, 2.3 and 3.1 carry over to this
scenario. The arguments leading to the characterization of the second-best mech-
anism are based on those presented in section 3.2, and the proofs of Propositions
1 and 2 in Appendix A deal with both scenarios at the same time. It is shown that
if sL > sH, then the second-best solution is depicted by point A in Figures 1 and 2
for the soft buyer and tough buyer, large market cases, respectively. And by point
D in Figure 3 for the tough buyer, small market case. Thus, when sL > sH, we have:
(a) Ifα ≤ α∗, then E = (1−α)NsH + [1− (1−α)N]sL.
(b) Ifα > α∗ and N ≥ N∗, then E = (1−α)NsH + [1− (1−α)N]sL
(c) Ifα > α∗ and 1 ≤ N < N∗, then E = α[1− (1−α)
N](cH − cL)sL
α(cH − cL)− (1−α)sH .
The first-best lies at point A; this is because (since sH < sL), in the first-best,
trade occurs with a low-type seller unless all sellers are of high type; and hence
the first-best has p˜H = (1 −α)N and p˜L = 1 − (1 −α)N. This means that the
second-best mechanism attains the first best outcome provided that it is not the
case that the buyer is tough and 1 ≤ N < N∗ (in this case Figure 3 applies, and
points A and D are different). Consequently, if first-best requires trading a lemon
rather than a peach, then the second-best mechanism attains the first-best except
in the special case when the market contains a sufficiently small number of sellers
each of whom owns a lemon with a sufficiently large probability. In this latter case,
12It may be noted that, in contrast, in markets with other kinds of asymmetric information the
first-best is typically attainable in the limit as the number of traders increases without bound (see,
eg., Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams (1994), who establish such a limiting result in markets
with private values.)
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second-best expected surplus is strictly increasing in the degree of market compe-
tition. Furthermore, relative efficiency, E/G, is strictly increasing in the degree of
market competition, N, over the range [1,N∗), and then E/G = 1 for all N ≥ N∗.
These results are consistent with conventional wisdom that more competition is
better, but of course this is valid only in those lemons markets in which trading a
lemon generates a higher social surplus than trading a peach.
4.2. Many Buyers. In Appendix B we extend our baseline model to a set-up in
which the market contains an arbitrary number M of buyers. It turns out that the
analysis and the results for the case whenM < N are essentially the same as for the
single buyer case. In particular, the second-best mechanism becomes less efficient
relative to the first-best when the number of competing sellers is increased beyond
a certain critical number. The analysis and results for the case when M ≥ N are
however different. For example, it is shown that increasing the number of sellers
(while maintaining the number of buyers at least equal to the number of sellers)
does not affect relative efficiency (the ratio of the second-best expected surplus to
the first-best).
4.3. Buyer Heterogeneity. The negative results established above raises the ques-
tion as to whether there is any way of overcoming them. In Muthoo and Mu-
tuswami (2005) we have studied an extension to our baseline model that allows
for private information on the buyer’s side. One might think that introducing pri-
vate information on the buyers side will add to the inefficiency; this, though, is not
necessarily correct because the private information on the buyers side can be used
to relax the low-type seller’s incentive constraint.
In the extended set-up there are two types of the buyer, one for whom the surplus
from trading a peach is more and the other for whom the surplus from trading a
lemon is higher. Then, the socially optimal decision — viz., which type of good to
transfer — depends on the type of the buyer which is unknown to the seller. In this
extended scenario, it is no longer clear that a low-type seller wants to pretend to
be a high-type: indeed, if the probability that a buyer is a “low” type is sufficiently
high, then she would not want to do so. This raises the possibility that the ineffi-
ciency resulting from the seller’s private information can be corrected by allowing
for private information on the buyer’s side.
Of course, introducing two types of the buyer makes the mechanism design
problem more complex because we have to deal with additional individual ratio-
nality and incentive compatibility constraints. We have not been able to character-
ize the solution to the resulting mechanism design problem completely. However,
we have been able to determine restrictions on parameters which ensure that when
the number of sellers is large enough, then we can find an asymptotically efficient
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mechanism. Our results in this regard suggest that while asymptotic efficiency in a
market for lemons settings is not a generic phenomenon, there are still significant
cases where it is possible.
4.4. Correlation. In our baseline model, the sellers’ types are independently dis-
tributed. One might ask, if by allowing for correlation, one can obtain positive
results as in Cre´mer and McLean (1988). They showed that if agents’ types are
correlated, then one can construct a two-stage ‘augmented mechanism’ which im-
plements the same outcome as the original mechanism, but where all agents’ in-
formational rents are driven down to zero. This fact can be used to implement ef-
ficient (first-best) outcomes in some circumstances provided the efficient outcome
is implementable without requiring budget balance: essentially, one can construct
an ‘augmented mechanism’ which recovers from the agents the implicit subsidy
needed to implement the efficient outcome. Thus, the key to seeing whether cor-
relation amongst sellers’ types can help in our context is to see whether we can
implement the efficient outcome if we do not require individual rationality and/or
budget balance. Note, however, that incentive compatibility by itself requires that
pˆH ≤ pˆL and this condition implies inefficiency whenever sH > sL. Therefore, the
first-best outcome is unimplementable even if we are willing to give up budget
balance and individual rationality and this shows that small correlation amongst
sellers’ types in unlikely to change the nature of our results.
4.5. Continuum of Types. Another interesting extension that one could consider
is to allow for a continuum of quality levels: that is, each seller’s object is of qual-
ity q where q lies in a compact interval [q, q]. Such an extended set-up with a
continuum of sellers’ types introduces two kinds of complications into our base-
line model. First, the computation of the first-best level of surplus for a given
number of sellers becomes complex because the optimal allocation depends on the
net surplus function s(q) = v(q)− c(q) about which nothing can be said a priori,
where v(q) and c(q) respectively are a buyer’s and a seller’s reservations values
for an object of quality q. Second, while one can extend the techniques introduced
in Samuelson (1984) for the bilateral lemons context to setup the problem for the
general case of many buyers and many sellers, solving the resulting problem ana-
lytically is not straightforward.
The main difference between a model with two types of sellers and one with a
continuum of sellers’ types is that incentive compatibility is a much more restric-
tive constraint in the latter. Intuitively, and very loosely, this suggests that the set of
feasible mechanisms “shrinks” when we move from a two-type model to a contin-
uum of types model. In our case, however, the main results that we have obtained
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with a two-type model are essentially negative, and this suggests that introducing
a continuum of types model is unlikely to change the nature of these results.
4.6. Mechanisms involving Third Parties. The combination of individual ratio-
nality and budget balance implies that there is no active role for third parties in
the trading mechanisms that we consider. Mezzetti (2004) shows that if the active
involvement of third parties is allowed, then it is possible to do better. Specifically,
Mezzetti considers a mechanism of the following type: (a) In the first stage, the
sellers report their types; (b) In the second stage, a decision is made as to which
seller transfers her object to the buyer. No transfers are made at this stage; (c)
After the object is transferred, the buyer and the sellers report their payoffs. The
transfers are made on the basis of the reports of the buyer in the third stage. The
key feature of this mechanism is that the trading decision is separated from the
transfers whereas they are simultaneously determined in our mechanisms.
While this is an interesting mechanism andMezzetti (2004) shows that it can im-
plement the efficient outcome in a bilateral lemons context, it should be noted that
the mechanism (i) requires budgets to be not balanced off-the-equilibrium path, (ii)
requires an active third party (since budget is not always balanced off equilibrium),
(iii) is vulnerable to collusion between the buyer and the third party. These aspects
make it difficult to justify this mechanism as a “reasonable” trading mechanism in
a market context.
5. DISCUSSION AND RELATED LITERATURE
5.1. Non-Monotonicity. One aspect of our results, both in the benchmark and the
extended models, is that relative efficiency — the “distance” between second-best
and first-best expected surpluses —may be a non-monotonic function of the num-
ber of sellers. In the benchmark model, non-monotonicity arises when the proba-
bility that each seller owns a lemon is high enough so that the high quality object
cannot be transferred with probability one even when all traders report that they
have high quality objects.13 When one adds additional sellers, the achievable ex-
pected surplus increases because the probability that all traders have high quality
objects decreases. However, the first-best level of expected surplus also increases,
and so it is not clear what happens to relative efficiency.
5.2. Impact of Market Size. Our analysis so far has involved holding the number
of buyers constant while changing the number of sellers. In contrast, the literature
in the private values case has considered the more traditional replication scenario,
13This is the case illustrated in Figure 3.
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where the number of buyers and sellers are both varied while keeping the buyer-
seller ratio constant. We have been able to derive limited results with regard to
the impact on efficiency of changing the market size for our benchmark model and
they are commensurate with the results that we obtain when only the number of
sellers is changed.
If N ≤ M (the number of buyers is more than the number of sellers), then the
analysis (in Appendix B) shows that replicating this economy has no impact on
market efficiency. The more interesting case is when M < N. We can divide the
analysis of this case into various sub-cases.
5.2.1. The case in which M < N,α ≤ α∗, and sH > sL. Here, as can be seen from Fig-
ure 8 (in Appendix B), the “induced individual rationality constraint of the buyer”
(given by p˜H[sH −α(vH − cL) + p˜L(1−α)sL ≥ 0) does not bind. The first-best in-
volves p˜H = N(1−α)bH , p˜L = M− N(1−α)bH which is point F on the diagram.
Hence, the first-best level of surplus is given by EM = N(1−α)bHsH+[M−N(1−
α)bH]sL. The achievable level of surplus (given by point B on the diagram) corre-
sponds to p˜H = (1−α)M, p˜L = αM and is given by E∗ = (1−α)MsH +αMsL.
Hence, the level of market efficiency is given by
E∗
EM
=
M[(1−α)sH +αsL]
N(1−α)bHsH + [M− N(1−α)bH]sL .
What happens when the market is replicated so that we have γM buyers and
γN sellers where γ > 1? The level of market efficiency is now given by
E∗
EM
(γ) =
M[(1−α)sH +αsL]
N(1−α)bH(γ)sH + [M− N(1−α)bH(γ)]sL
where bH(γ) is the value of bH (given by (B.1)) when there are γM buyers and γN
sellers. We are unable to show formally that bH(γ) is increasing in γ though simu-
lation with a variety of parameters suggests it. Assuming that bH(γ) is increasing
in γ, this means that market efficiency decreases as a function of market size. This
is illustrated by the simulation in Figure 5.14
5.2.2. The case of M < N, α > α∗, and sH > sL. There are two possibilities here
illustrated by Figures 9 and 10. In Figure 9, the optimal solution lies at point C
which is above point A. Here, the situation corresponds to the previous subcase
and market efficiency decreases as a function of market size because the distance
between point C (the second-best) and point F (the first-best) increases as the mar-
ket size grows. In Figure 10, the optimal solution is at point D. When the market
14The parameters used in Figure 5 are α = 0.35, vH = 2.25, vL = 1.15 and in Figure 6, α =
0.75, vH = 2.25, vL = 1.1. Note that all simulations have been done starting with an initial setting
of M = 1,N = 2 and cH = 2, cL = 1.
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size increases—at least, initially—market efficiency increases because the distance
between point D and point F decreases. However, this cannot last because at some
stage, the situation must revert to the one depicted in Figure 9 and at this point,
market efficiency starts to decrease. Note that what is happening here is similar
to what happens when we increase the number of sellers only. Figure 6 depicts a
simulation corresponding to this sub-case.
5.2.3. The case in which M < N and sL > sH. Here, if the first-best is achievable
(point A in Figures 8–9) then we will continue to achieve the first-best even when
we replicate this market. So, we start with a situation of full efficiency and con-
tinue to get it as the market is replicated. Figure 10, however, illustrates that the
first-best (point A) may not always be achievable. Here, replicating the market can
increase market efficiency as the simulation in Figure 7 shows. This is similar to
what happened when we increased the number of sellers only. However, when
we increase the number of sellers only, we also showed that asymptotic efficiency
was always obtained. Since we are increasing the numbers of both sellers and buy-
ers here, we might intuitively suspect that asympototic efficiency may not obtain.
Figure 7 shows that this intuition is correct.15
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FIGURE 5. Market efficiency v/s Market size when sH > sL illustrat-
ing decreasing efficiency with increasing market size.
5.3. Related literature. The literature on the market for lemons is too large to be
summarized here; we confine ourselves to discussing those papers which have a
direct bearing on our paper. The use of the mechanism design methodology can
be regarded as a direct follow-up to the work of Samuelson (1984) who studied the
15The parameters used for the simulation depicted in Figure 7 are vL = 1.15, vH = 2.05 and
α = 0.35.
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FIGURE 6. Market efficiency v/s Market size when sH > sL illustrat-
ing non-monotonic behaviour of the efficiency ratio.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0.88
0.89
0.9
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.97
FIGURE 7. Market efficiency v/s Market size when sL > sH
bilateral lemons problem; our extension consists of analyzing the general case of
finite but arbitrary number of sellers and buyers.16
The inefficiency pointed to by Akerlof (1970) has prompted economists to exam-
ine ways by which this inefficiency can be overcome. For instance, Klein and Lef-
fler (1981) and Tirole (1996) have suggested that repeated interactions may over-
come the adverse selection problem; on another dimension, the works of Hendel
and Lizzeri (1999), Janssen and Roy (2002) and Hendel, Lizzeri and Siniscalchi
(2004) suggest that particular features of the durable goods market, when taken
into account, can overcome partially or even fully the inefficiency associated with
the lemons market.
Our extended model is in the same spirit as these papers; however, there are
two differences. Firstly, the other papers mostly use models with a continuum of
agents; their models cannot therefore directly address the question of interest to
us which is the impact of competition on market efficiency. In this context, note
16See also Evans (1989), Vincent (1989), Gul and Postlewaite (1992), and Manelli and Vincent
(1995).
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that in our extended model, we need private information on the buyers’ side as
well as a large number of sellers to obtain efficiency. Secondly, in contrast to the
other papers which use the dynamic element, our extended model is still a static
one and as such, closer to the basic Akerlof model. Our results thus show that it
is possible to obtain asymptotic efficiency even in markets for non-durable goods
and without using repeated game effects.17
APPENDIX A: OMITTED PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1. The lemma can be established using standard techniques. Here is an
outline of the argument:
(I) Incentive Compatibility implies that pˆH ≤ pˆL: We can write (1) and (2) as
( pˆH − pˆL)cH ≤ tˆH − tˆL ≤ ( pˆH − pˆL)cL.
The result follows since cH > cL.
(II) For each type of seller, either her incentive compatibility constraint binds or her individ-
ual rationality constraints binds: Suppose, to the contrary, that neither (1) nor (3) bind for
the high-type seller. Then, one can increase the expected surplus by increasing pˆH and
lowering tˆH without violating incentive compatibility or individual rationality. The same
argument applies with respect to the low-type seller.
(III) It cannot be the case that both incentive compatibility constraints bind: Suppose, to the
contrary, that this is the case. Then, neither individual rationality constraint can bind. We
can thus increase the expected surplus by increasing pˆH and pˆL both by > 0 and decreas-
ing tˆH and tˆL both by δ > 0. Note that these changes do not affect the incentive compat-
ibility constraints. If  and δ are small enough, then the individual rationality constraints
are unaffected.
(IV) It cannot be the case that the high-type seller’s incentive compatibility constraint and the
low-type seller’s individual rationality constraint bind: Suppose, to the contrary, that this is the
case. Then, we have tˆH = tˆL+( pˆH− pˆL)cH = pˆLcL+( pˆH− pˆL)cH. Therefore, tˆH− pˆHcH =
pˆLcL + ( pˆH − pˆL)cH − pˆHcH = pˆL(cL − cH). Since cL < cH, this implies that we must
have pˆL = 0, which in turn implies that pˆH = 0, and via the incentive compatibility
constraints, that tˆH = tˆL. This implies that both incentive compatibility constraints bind, a
contradiction.
17It is interesting to note that in the context of standard models of oligopolistic price competition
but with the novel feature that consumers engage in costly search, Stahl (1989) and Janssen and
Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) have shown that under certain conditions, increasing the number com-
peting firms reduces welfare, and that the optimal market structure is one with a small number
of firms. Furthermore, under some conditions there can be a non-monotonic relationship between
welfare and the number of competing firms. These results, which are derived by bringing the stan-
dard oligopoly and search models together within a single framework, challenge the conventional
wisdom that welfare is increasing in the number of firms. Although these results are derived in a
world with symmetric information, they nonetheless offer an interesting parallel to the “similar”
results obtained in the current paper in the context of lemons markets.
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Hence, at a solution to (9), inequalities (2) and (3) will be binding constraints.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that ( pˆH , pˆL, tˆH , tˆL) solves the mechanism design problem
(9). Then, p˜H = N(1 −α) pˆH and p˜L = Nα pˆL satisfy (10)–(14), and so E ≤ E∗. Now
suppose that ( p˜H , p˜L) solves the reduced-form mechanism design problem (15). Define
pˆH = p˜H/N(1−α), pˆL = p˜L/Nα, tˆH = pˆHcH, and tˆL = pˆLcL + pˆH(cH − cL). It is straight-
forward to verify that ( pˆH , pˆL, tˆH , tˆL) satisfies (1)–(8), and hence E∗ ≤ E. Therefore E = E∗.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2.18 We conveniently break our argument into two main
cases, depending on whether Z is negative or positive, where
Z ≡ sH −α(vH − cL)
is the coefficient of p˜H in (14). First consider the case when Z ≥ 0 (i.e.,α < sH/(vH− cL)).19
In this case (14) can be rewritten as
p˜H ≥
[
−(1−α)sL
Z
]
p˜L,
and hence (since Z ≥ 0) the feasible set of the maximization problem (15) is the shaded
region in Figure 1. It thus follows that in this case the unique solution of (15) is at point B
if sH > sL and at point A if sH < sL, i.e.,
( p˜L, p˜H) =
⎧⎨
⎩(α, 1−α) if sH > sL,(1− (1−α)N , (1−α)N) if sH < sL.
Now consider the case when Z < 0 (i.e., α > sH/(vH − cL)). In this case (14) can be
rewritten as
p˜H ≤
[
−(1−α)sL
Z
]
p˜L.
Notice that in this case the line
(A.1) p˜H =
[
−(1−α)sL
Z
]
p˜L
is positively sloped; whereas in the previous case when Z ≥ 0, the line (A.1) was non-
positively sloped. There are three subcases to consider here, depending on the relative
position of the line (A.1).
If the slope of the line (A.1) is greater than or equal to (1 −α)/α — which is the case
if and only if α ≤ α∗ — then (A.1) lies above the line p˜H = [(1−α)/α] p˜L, and hence the
feasible set of the maximization problem (15) in this case [when α ∈ (sH/(vH − cL),α∗)]
continues to be the shaded region in Figure 1. It thus follows that in this case the unique
solution of (15) is the same as for the case above whenα < sH/(vH − cL).
18Since it is convenient to do so, the argument here establishes Propositions 1 and 2 which con-
cern the baseline model in which sH > sL, but also establishes the corresponding results stated in
subsection 4.1 that concern the scenario in which sL > sH .
19It may be noted that sH/(vH − cL) < α∗, and hence this case refers to Proposition 1.
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Now suppose that α > α∗ — which means that the line (A.1) lies below the line p˜H =
[(1 −α)/α] p˜L. This is shown in Figures 2 and 3, depending on whether it intersects the
line p˜H + p˜L = 1 to the left of (or at) point A or to the right of point A. After some
simplification, it can be shown that the former is the case if and only if inequality (16) holds;
and that the latter is the case if and only if (16) does not hold — notice that Proposition 2(i)
concerns the former case while Proposition 2(ii) the latter.
When (16) holds, the unique solution of (15) lies, as shown in Figure 2, at point C if
sH > sL and at point A if sH < sL, i.e.,
( p˜L, p˜H) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[ −Z
(1−α)sL − Z ,
(1−α)sL
(1−α)sL − Z
]
if sH > sL,
(1− (1−α)N , (1−α)N) if sH < sL.
When (16) does not hold, then the unique solution of (15) lies, as shown in Figure 3, at
point D, i.e.,
p˜L = 1− (1−α)N and p˜H =
[
−(1−α)sL
Z
]
[1− (1−α)N ].
APPENDIX B: GENERALIZATION TO THE MANY-BUYERS CASE
The only difference between the mechanism design problem with M = 1, as stated in
(9), and the problemwith an arbitrary number M of buyers concern the three admissibility
conditions. Suppose there are k sellers in all reporting that they are of type H. Let pqk
denote the probability that a q type seller sells his product in this state of the world. Since
symmetry implies that all q-type sellers must be treated identically, it follows that
pHk ≤ min{1,M/k} for k > 0 and pLk ≤ min{1,M/(N − k)} for k < N.
Taking expectations across all possible realizations of k, these conditions imply that the
mechanism must satisfy the following two conditions:
(B.1) pˆH ≤
N−1
∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(1−α)kαN−1−kmin
{
1,
M
k+ 1
}
and
(B.2) pˆL ≤
N−1
∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(1−α)kαN−1−kmin
{
1,
M
N − k
}
Furthermore, since the expected number of objects transferred to the buyers must be less
than or equal to min{M,N}, the mechanism must also satisfy
(B.3) N[(1−α) pˆH +α pˆL] ≤ min{M,N}.
The mechanism design problem for an arbitrary M and arbitrary N is:
(B.4) E ≡ max
pˆH , pˆL ,tˆH ,tˆL
N
[
(1−α) pˆHsH +α pˆLsL
]
subject to (1)–(5) and (B.1)–(B.3).
26 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND SURESH MUTUSWAMI
The Case ofM < N. We solve the mechanism design problem (B.4) in this case in exactly
the same manner as we did above for the case when M = 1. The only difference is that
now the three admissibility constraints (B.1), (B.2) and (B.3) respectively become (using the
same change of variables)
(B.5) p˜H ≤ N(1−α)bH ,
(B.6) p˜L ≤ NαbL and
(B.7) p˜L + p˜H ≤ M,
where bH and bL respectively denote the right-hand sides of (B.1) and (B.2). Hence, the
mechanism design problem (B.4) for the case when M < N can be solved by instead solv-
ing the following reduced-form problem:
(B.8) E ≡ max
p˜H , p˜L
p˜HsH + p˜LsL
subject to (13)–(14) and (B.5)–(B.7) .
With the aid of Figures 8-10 — which parallel Figures 1–3 — it is relatively easy to char-
acterize the solution to (B.8) by using exactly the same arguments to those used in estab-
lishing Propositions 1 and 2.20 In discussing the impact of the degree of competition on
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p˜L
p˜H =
[ 1−α
α
]
p˜L
p˜H [sH −α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1−α)sL = 0
F
B
A
p˜H
p˜H + p˜L = M
NαbLMα
N(1−α)bH
M(1−α)
FIGURE 8. The feasible set when M < N andα ≤ α∗.
the second-best mechanism, we keep M fixed at some arbitrary level and allow N to vary
20It should be noted that both bH and bL are bounded from below by M/N. Furthermore, bH
and bL are respectively bounded from above by M(1−αN)/N(1−α) and M[1− (1−α)N ]/Nα.
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FIGURE 9. The feasible set when M < N, α > α∗ and point C lies
above point A.
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F
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p˜H [sH −α(vH − cL)] + p˜L(1−α)sL = 0
D
p˜H
p˜H + p˜L = M
Mα NαbL
M(1−α)
N(1−α)bH
FIGURE 10. The feasible set when M < N, α > α∗ and point C,
which is not shown, lies below point A.
over the set {M+ 1,M+ 2, . . .}. First, consider the case when the buyers are soft. We first
note that when sL > sH then point A in Figure 8 depicts both the second-best outcome
and the first-best outcome. On the other hand, when sH > sL then point F depicts the
first-best outcome while point B the second-best outcome. Since point B is unaffected by
N while point Fmoves upwards along the p˜H + p˜L = M line, where the former means that
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the second-best expected surplus is independent of N while the latter means that first-best
expected surplus is increasing in N, we obtain that relative efficiency is decreasing in N
(for a fixed M < N).
Now consider the case when the buyers are tough. Just like in the single buyer case it
can be shown that point C lies above point A (and hence Figure 9 applies) when N ≥ N∗,
where N∗ ≥ 2; and that C lies below A (and hence Figure 10 applies) when N < N∗.
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pˆH [(sH −α(vH − cL)] +α pˆLsL = 0
1
1
(1−α) pˆH +α pˆL = 1
FIGURE 11. The feasible set when M ≥ N andα ≤ α∗.
The Case of M ≥ N. Since M ≥ N, it follows that bH = bL = 1 (i.e., it is possible for all
sellers to sell their objects since the total number of buyers exceeds the number of sellers).
Hence, the admissibility conditions (B.1) and (B.2) respectively become
(B.9) pˆH ≤ 1 and
(B.10) pˆL ≤ 1.
Since M ≥ N the admissibility condition (B.3) becomes:
(B.11) (1−α) pˆH +α pˆL ≤ 1
Finally, since the analysis in section 3.1 applies, it follows that the relevant IC and IR con-
ditions are [after undoing the change of variables]:
(B.12) pˆH ≤ pˆL and
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FIGURE 12. The feasible set when M ≥ N andα > α∗
.
(B.13) pˆH
[
sH −α(vH − cL)
]
+α pˆLsL ≥ 0.
This means that the mechanism design problem (B.4) becomes:
(B.4) E ≡ max
pˆH , pˆL ,tˆH ,tˆL
N
[
(1−α) pˆHsH +α pˆLsL
]
subject to (B.9)–(B.13).
Figures 11 and 12 respectively illustrate the feasible sets for the soft buyer and tough buyer
cases. In both figures, the efficient point is defined uniquely by the intersection of the three
admissibility constraints; this is point B in both diagrams. Figure 11 shows that when
α ≤ α∗, the first-best is achievable even with one seller (and at least one buyer). Increasing
the number of sellers while maintaining the number of buyers at least equal to the number
of sellers preserves efficiency. When α > α∗, on the other hand, Figure 12 shows that the
first-best is no longer achievable. Increasing the number of sellers (while maintaining the
number of buyers at least equal to the number of sellers) has no effect on the ability to
achieve efficiency.
REFERENCES
Akerlof, G. (1970), “The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market mecha-
nism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488-500.
Cre´mer, J. and R. P. McLean (1988), “Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dom-
inant strategy auctions,” Econometrica, 56, 1247-1257.
Evans, R. (1989), “Sequential bargaining with correlated values,” Review of Economic
Studies, 56, 499-510.
30 ABHINAY MUTHOO AND SURESH MUTUSWAMI
Gresik, T. and M.A. Satterthwaite (1989), “The rate at which a simple market becomes
efficient as the number of traders increases: an asymptotic result for optimal trading
mechanisms,” Journal of Economic Theory, 48, 304-332.
Gul, F. and A. Postlewaite (1992), “ Asymptotic efficiency in large exchange economies
with asymmetric information,” Econometrica, 60, 1273-1292.
Hendel, I., and A. Lizzeri (1999), “Adverse selection in durable goods markets,” Ameri-
can Economic Review December, 1097-1115.
Hendel, I., A. Lizzeri and M. Siniscalchi (2004), “Efficient sorting in a dynamic adverse-
selection model,” forthcoming in Review of Economic Studies.
Janssen, M. and S. Roy (2002), “Dynamic trading in durable good market with asym-
metric information,” International Economic Review, 43:1, 257-282.
Janssen, M. and J.L. Moraga-Gonzalez (2004), “Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search, and
the Number of Firms,” Review of Economic Studies, 71, 1089-1118.
Klein, B. and K. B. Leffler (1981), “The role of market forces in assuring contractual
performance,” Journal of Political Economy, 89, 615-641.
Manelli, A.M. and D. R. Vincent (1995), “Optimal Procurement Mechanisms,” Economet-
rica, 63, 591-620.
Mezzetti, C. (2004), “Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency”
Econometrica, 72, 1617-1626.
Muthoo, A. and Mutuswami (2005), “Competition and Efficiency in Markets with Qual-
ity Uncertainty,” Department of Economics, University of Essex, Discussion Paper
No. 593.
Myerson, R. and M.A. Satterthwaite (1983), “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trade,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 29, 265-281.
Rustichini, A., M.A. Satterthwaite and S.R. Williams (1994), “Convergence to efficiency
in a simple market with incomplete information,” Econometrica, 62, 1041-1064.
Samuelson, W. (1984), “Bargaining under asymmetric information,” Econometrica, 52,
992-1005.
Stahl, D.O. (1989), “Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search,” American
Economic Review, 79, 700-712.
Tirole, J. (1996), “A theory of collective reputations (with applications to the persistence
of corruption and firm quality),” Review of Economic Studies, 63, 1-22.
Vincent, D. (1989), “Bargaining with common values,” Journal of Economic Theory, 48.
Wilson, C.A. (1979), “Equilibrium and Adverse Selection,” American Economic Review,
69, 313-317.
COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY 31
Wilson, C.A. (1980), “The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection,”
The Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 108-130.
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK, COVENTRY CV4 7AL, ENGLAND,
UK.
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER, UNIVERSITY ROAD, LEICESTER LE1
7RH, ENGLAND, UK.
E-mail address: A.Muthoo@warwick.ac.uk
E-mail address: sm403@le.ac.uk
